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ABSTRACT
This article considers whether survey respondents’ views regarding the likelihood of stock index
returns exceeding speciﬁc thresholds are comparable to market views indicated by index options
with strikes at analogous thresholds. It is motivated by the observation that the wording used to
elicit subjective beliefs in surveys about expected future returns resembles the question a purchaser
of a call option might ask. Building on this association, the authors document a similarity between
the views of survey respondents and those of ﬁnancial market participants as measured through
call options, although the association is not 1-for-1. They ﬁnd a closer association for those
demonstrating a better understanding of the laws of probability, suggesting that numeracy affects
the accuracy of an elicited response.
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Introduction
In this article we compare people’s beliefs about future
stock returns as elicited through surveys with those
derived from option prices. In performing this compari-
son, we contribute to the literature that has documented
differences between respondents’ stated probabilities and
behavioral probabilities in the context of stock returns
(e.g., Hurd and Rohwedder [2010], Dominitz and Manski
[2011], Barone-Adesi, Mancini, and Shefrin [2013]).
When we compare the beliefs of survey respondents with
the behavior of ﬁnancial market participants as revealed
through option prices, we ﬁnd that survey expectations of
the general population do seem to reﬂect the beliefs
embedded in option prices and that this similarity is stron-
ger for those with greater probabilistic understanding.
Our results also contribute to the research on the
information content of subjective (survey) expectations,
the tendency of survey respondents to report focal points
(clustering around rounded numbers) when asked prob-
abilistic questions, and the role numeracy and cognition
plays in the elicitation of survey responses. Underlying
this research is the question of whether surveys provide
meaningful information, and there are large literatures
that have considered this question in a variety of
contexts. Although these areas have all been studied pre-
viously in the context of stock returns, no study (to the
best of our knowledge) has drawn the connection
between subjective expectations of a speciﬁed return
threshold and corresponding option strike levels, as we
do in this article. In considering this connection, we are
particularly motivated by the literature on question
framing. Question framing has been shown to inﬂuence
survey responses to even the most basic questions (in the
context of a simple 5-point self-assessed health question,
see Bowling and Windsor [2008], J€urges, Avendano, and
Mackenbach [2008], Lumsdaine and Exterkate [2013])
as well as consumer behavior (e.g., Juster [1966],
Schweitzer [1995], Brown, Kapteyn, and Mitchell
[2016]). In addition, the role of framing in communica-
tion is garnering increasing attention (regarding commu-
nication of pension funds to their clients, see Keren
[2012]). We therefore consider whether the probabilities
reported by survey participants in response to an option-
framed question resemble those implied by actual option
prices. Evidence of similarity would indicate that
respondents seem to understand the question being
asked, and would lend validity to the use of surveys to
elicit probabilities about ﬁnancial topics.
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The article proceeds as follows. The second section
contains a brief review of related literature. In the third
section we detail the data construction and descriptive
statistics of the main variables. In the fourth section we
describe the model used in our analyses. In the ﬁfth sec-
tion we present results. In the ﬁnal section we conclude.
Supplemental material containing information on the
sample construction, the construction of ﬁnancial mar-
ket beliefs, detailed descriptive statistics, the derivation
of the likelihood function, and additional estimation
results is provided in a series of Online Appendices.
Background
We are interested in the determinants of people’s survey
responses regarding the probability of future stock
returns and whether these responses resemble the proba-
bilities that are observed in ﬁnancial markets via option
prices, acknowledging that there are 2 opposing views a
priori as to what we might ﬁnd. To some a link would
seem obvious; they might argue that (1) ﬁnancial market
ﬂuctuations are merely the aggregate result of individual
investor decisions, and (2) management decisions of
publicly traded ﬁrms reﬂect the views of the general
(shareholder) population. For example, Barone-Adesi
et al. [2013] provided a theoretical foundation for this
link, noting that both investors’ beliefs and option prices
can be described by the same underlying pricing kernel
with the link between them akin to a change of measure.
Even beyond such efﬁcient markets explanations, feed-
back and herding models in behavioral ﬁnance would
suggest that people’s beliefs are inﬂuenced by what hap-
pens in the ﬁnancial markets (e.g., Hirshleifer [2001],
Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Teoh [2002], Shiller [2003]). In
contrast, to others a link would be surprising, given evi-
dence of low ﬁnancial literacy rates (Lusardi and Mitchell
[2011]), the link between survey measurement and cog-
nition in general (Schwarz [2007]) and speciﬁcally evi-
dence that the ability to form probabilities about stock
returns is related to cognitive ability (Binswanger and
Salm [2014]), the fact that few Americans hold stocks
outside of a retirement portfolio (Poterba and Samwick
[1995]) and the reliance on heuristics in forming
responses to survey questions (Krosnick [1991]).
As a result, for the most part, many who have docu-
mented a link between survey expectations and returns
emphasize the importance of eliciting expectations from
ﬁnancial market participants rather than the general
population as the two populations may differ (see Man-
kiw, Reis, and Wolfers [2004], Bacchetta, Mertens, and
van Wincoop [2009], Hoffman, Post and Pennings
[2013, 2015]). But even among the subset of the popula-
tion that is active in ﬁnancial markets, others have found
evidence that not all participants are informed (e.g., De
Long, Shleifer, Summers, and Waldmann [1990]) and
that for a variety of reasons, returns of subgroups of
investors often differ systematically (e.g., Barber and
Odean [2000], Coval, Hirshleifer, and Shumway [2005]).
So in extending our inquiry to survey expectations from
a representative sample of the U.S. population it is not at
all apparent whether their responses will reﬂect ﬁnancial
market participants’ views as measured by ﬁnancial pri-
ces, and if so, to what extent. Additionally, most compar-
isons between beliefs about future events elicited through
surveys of the general population have been with histori-
cal stock returns (e.g., Dominitz and Manski [2011],
Hurd and Rohwedder [2012]), which by their nature are
backward looking.1 We instead use option prices for
comparison, as by construction they are forward-look-
ing. Therefore, they may prove to have a stronger link to
survey beliefs than that previously found using returns.2
Researchers using survey data to elicit expectations
about future equity returns ﬁnd substantial heterogeneity
across individuals (Brennan, Cao, Strong, and Xu [2005],
Ben-David, Graham, and Harvey [2010], Dominitz and
Manski [2011], Hudomiet, Kezdi, and Willis [2011]),
whether those surveys cover professional forecasters or
members of the general population. This heterogeneity
has been linked to a variety of demographic characteris-
tics (e.g., race, gender, education), ﬁnancial knowledge
or experience, differences in susceptibility to behavioral
biases such as probability weighting, (over)optimism and
the disposition effect (Shefrin and Statman [1985],
Weber and Camerer [1998], Odean [1998], Hens and
Vlcek [2011]), and many other explanations. Heteroge-
neity in expectations has in turn been used to explain
heterogeneous equity investment decisions (Kezdi and
Willis [2003, 2011]).
There is also substantial evidence in nonﬁnance con-
texts that survey responses do not exactly align with true
probabilities (Viscusi and Hakes [2003])—for example,
due to large clusters of responses occurring at focal
points of the response distribution (e.g., Dominitz and
Manski [1997], Hurd, McFadden, and Gan [1998],
Kleinjans and Van Soest [2010], Manski and Molinari
[2010])—and that adjustments to survey data to account
for such aspects are necessary to improve inference (Bas-
sett and Lumsdaine [2000], Lillard and Willis [2001]).
Beyond studying the relationship between survey
expectations and subsequent realizations, a number of
researchers consider the inclusion of survey expectations
in models of economic behavior (for a survey of this lit-
erature, see Manski [2004]) and demonstrate that includ-
ing probabilistic expectations can improve inference
about economic behavior relative to models using only
data on economic choices (revealed preference models).
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As noted previously, in the context of equity returns,
most research using survey expectations has focused on
the views of “informed” investors (i.e., those that are
active in the ﬁnancial markets) and hence are less likely
to suffer from psychological biases in the evaluation of
probabilities. Three important exceptions are Hurd and
Rohwedder [2012], who used the same data we consider
to identify correlations between survey expectations and
subsequent equity returns, and Dominitz and Manski
[2011] and Greenwood and Shleifer [2014], both of
whom used the University of Michigan survey of con-
sumers (the latter also consider a number of investor-
based surveys). To the best of our knowledge, none of
the previous literature has used option prices in conjunc-
tion with survey responses to compare these views.
Data
We use the American Life Panel (ALP) for our analysis,
an internet panel administered by the RAND Corpora-
tion. Since its start in 2003, it has expanded from about
500 to over 6,000 panel members, drawn from the Uni-
versity of Michigan Monthly Survey and other sources.
The ALP contains around 500 researcher-contributed
survey modules, the responses of which are publicly
available. Demographic characteristics of respondents
are available through the Household information mod-
ule, which is updated on a quarterly basis. Sampling
weights are assigned such that the weighted distribution
is representative of the U.S. population with regard to
sociodemographic variables.3 Throughout this article,
sampling weights are used when reporting descriptive
statistics and regression results.4
While some of the survey modules are stand-alone,
others belong to periodically repeated series (waves) on
the same topic. This article uses responses obtained from
modules designed by Michael Hurd and Susann Roh-
wedder to investigate the effects of the ﬁnancial crisis on
American households, gathered from November 5, 2008
until March 10, 2011, corresponding to 25 waves of
information. For each module, participants are invited to
ﬁll out the survey within a certain time frame.
Hurd and Rohwedder [2010] provided a detailed
description of this series of modules; it is brieﬂy summa-
rized here. The ﬁrst wave asks respondents about a wide
range of topics such as labor force status, stock owner-
ship, mortgage payments, and expectations about the
future. Through linkage with the Household Information
module, each module also contains demographic control
variables such as age, race, gender, marital status, and
education. The ﬁnal sample (after adjustments for, e.g.,
missing observations) consists of 47,488 surveys from
2,652 respondents (94.9% of the total number of surveys
and 98.3% of the total number of respondents) gathered
over 364 survey days. The sample construction is further
detailed in Supplemental Online Appendix A.
Survey expectations about stock market returns
The ALP elicits expectations about stock market returns
from survey participants via a series of questions, the ﬁrst
of which is the following:
“We are interested in how well you think the economy
will do in the future. On a scale from 0% to 100% where
0 means that you think there is absolutely no chance,
and 100 means that you think the event is absolutely
sure to happen, what are the chances that by next year at
this time mutual fund shares invested in blue chip stocks
like those in the Dow Jones Industrial Average will be
worth more than they are today?”
Respondents can give an answer ranging from 0 to
100 (the answer need not be an integer) to indicate the
percentage chance of the event happening, or they can
leave the response blank.
The same structure is repeated for two additional
questions, asking respondents to assess the chances of a
greater than 20% return and a greater than ¡20%
return.5 For expositional ease, the questions referring to
the probability of a positive return, a more than 20%
return, and a more than ¡20% return will be referred to
as PositiveReturn, >Plus20, and >Minus20, respectively.
Using all 3 questions (when available) from the 47,488
surveys yields a total sample size for studying survey-
generated probabilities of 139,327 observations.
The phrasing of these questions may lead to differences
in respondents’ interpretation and hence the answers they
give, since there is an implicit subjectivity associated with
respondents’ understanding of “mutual fund shares” or
“blue chip stocks like those in the Dow Jones Industrial
Average.” For the purposes of this article, however, we
assume that the responses given represent respondents’
subjective probability that the nominal (not inﬂation-
adjusted) level of the Dow Jones Industrial Average (DJIA)
in 1 year will have increased (similarly, will have increased
by more than 20% or more than ¡20%) versus the current
level of the DJIA. For each respondent, the current level of
the index is assumed to be the closing level on the most
recent business date before the date of interview, so that
the response is assured to chronologically follow the infor-
mation on which the ﬁnancial market prices are based.
Figure 1 shows a histogram of the frequency of speciﬁc
responses to each of the three probabilistic questions indi-
vidually, as well as all three combined (“Aggregate”). Most
of the responses are integers—only 41 of 139,327 are non-
integers. That respondents appear to favor round num-
bers, leading to clusters of responses at certain values, is a
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common occurrence in responses to probabilistic subjec-
tive questions.6 For the 3 questions in this article, 93.8% of
person-wave responses are a multiple of 5 and 68.0% are a
multiple of 10. A response of 50 occurs 19.9% of the time;
in addition, 3.5% are 0 and 3.1% are 100. In addition,
63.0% of the 8,701 responses that are not multiples of 5
are between 0 and 5 or between 95 and 100.
Calculating Option-Implied Probabilities
The wording and return thresholds (–20%, 0%, 20%)
given in the 3 ALP questions correspond to strike price
levels of a European call option with 1-year maturity,
namely the 20% in-the-money, at-the-money, and
20% out-of-the-money thresholds. For each day that a
survey was answered (364 days in total), we therefore
use Bloomberg to derive analogous probabilities from
option prices for comparison to those reported by the
respondents in the ALP. The details of this construction
are explained extensively in Supplemental Online
Appendix B and hence only summarized brieﬂy here.
While we recognize that there are numerous ways to
derive such probabilities, in this article we adopt a fairly
basic approach so as not to obscure the main question of
interest (the degree of relationship between the two sets
of beliefs).7 In the standard Black-Scholes model, the
price at time t of a European call option with a strike
price of K and an expiry date of T > t is given by:
F d1ð ÞSte¡ q T ¡ tð Þ¡F d2ð ÞKe¡ r T ¡ tð Þ (1)
where
d1D ln
St=K
 C r¡ qC s22
 
T ¡ tð Þ
s
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
T ¡ tp ; d2D d1¡ s
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
T ¡ tp
(2)
The interest rate (r) is the (continuous) U.S. dollar
swap rate over the period [t,T] (which is the default rate
Figure 1. Frequency of responses to probabilistic questions. Note: These ﬁgures contain histograms of the responses to the 3 questions
that ask respondents to consider the probability of a more than ¡20% return, a positive return, and a more than 20% return, as well as
for all 3 questions combined (“Aggregate”). The responses to the 3 questions are called >Minus20, PositiveReturn, and >Plus20, respec-
tively, and together comprise the dependent variable. The ﬁgures document the large pile-up of responses at focal points, particularly
around the response of “50,” motivating the econometric model. Observations in these ﬁgures are unweighted.
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for option price calculations in Bloomberg), the dividend
rate (q) is the Bloomberg forecast for the DJIA dividend
rate during the same period, the volatility (s) is the
implied volatility corresponding to each speciﬁed strike
price (relative to the spot price St) and a time to expira-
tion T – t.
For each survey day t, the daily implied volatilities are
determined by Bloomberg based on option prices assum-
ing a Black-Scholes option pricing kernel. For those strike
prices and times to expiration for which options on a par-
ticular asset are available (i.e., traded), corresponding
implied volatilities can be derived. From these, implied
volatilities for other combinations of strike prices and
times to expiration can be estimated (details are given in
Online Appendix B).8 In particular, implied volatilities for
a time to expiration (T-t) of approximately 1 year (i.e.,
ranging from exactly 1 year in the case that the option is
traded and as short as 336 days—that is, 1 year minus 29
days—for the day after an option is traded) and strike pri-
ces of 80%, 100%, and 120% of the level of the index at
time t were constructed, consistent with the time horizon
and return categories articulated in the ALP survey ques-
tions and corresponding to the questions >Minus20,
PositiveReturn, and >Plus20, respectively.
Comparing survey responses to option
price information
To compare the ALP survey responses to the information
contained in the option prices, each of the 139,327 survey
observations is ﬁrst assigned a corresponding Option-
Implied Probability (OIP) associated with the date before
the day the interview was conducted.9 Speciﬁcally, for a
given option threshold (i.e., > ¡20%, >0%, or > 20%) all
individuals that were interviewed on a given day are
assigned the same OIP, and the number of OIPs assigned
to a speciﬁc person corresponds to the number of waves
in which the person provided a survey response at that
threshold. The time series showing the average daily sur-
vey responses and the corresponding OIP for each of the
three thresholds is shown in Figure 2. In each panel, the 2
pairs of series broadly move together. In general the survey
respondents predict a lower probability of a > ¡20%
return and a higher probability of a > 20% return than is
implied from option prices. Table 1 contains summary sta-
tistics for the three sets of probabilities, aggregated across
all observations. Not surprisingly, the average probability
associated with >Plus20 is lower than the average proba-
bility associated with PositiveReturn, which in turn is lower
than that associated with>Minus20.
For the upper return threshold on the DJIA (the row
labeled “> 20%”), there is a relatively close correspon-
dence between the average OIP (24.0%) and the average
survey probability (27.1%) regarding the expectation that
the 1-year return on the DJIA will exceed 20%. There is
more of a difference when considering the probability
that the DJIA will increase (the row labeled “> 0%”),
with an average 40.4% survey probability of a positive
return versus an OIP average of 57.1% from the corre-
sponding OIPs. There is also a divide between the 2
measures when it comes to the probability of a more
than ¡20% return in the DJIA (the row labeled “>
¡20%”), with the survey responses markedly more pessi-
mistic (the mean of >Minus20 is 75.8%) than the aver-
age OIP (83.0%). If market probabilities are considered
objective probabilities, then the survey probabilities are
consistent with the overweighting of extreme events
(returns), or the overestimation of small probabilities
and underestimation of large ones that are often found
among respondents (e.g., Hakes and Viscusi [2004]).
Further, survey respondents’ overall beliefs are more pes-
simistic than those of the market.
Looking solely at the means across all three strike levels
is of course not sufﬁcient to draw conclusions as to
whether survey respondents’ and the market’s beliefs coin-
cide, despite similar patterns that show respondents
assigning relatively higher probabilities to large changes in
the level of the index. Comparing standard deviations, the
survey probabilities inherently have greater variation than
can be explained by the variation in OIPs alone, further
motivating the need for a formal model that incorporates
additional covariates. Standard deviations for the survey
responses (20.0%, 26.8%, and 21.6% for >Minus20, Positi-
veReturn, and >Plus20, respectively) are very large both as
a proportion of the bounded range of 0–100% and in
comparison to those derived from option prices (4.9%,
2.9%, and 4.3%, respectively). This is partly a result of the
analytical design, as all participants on the same day are
assigned the same OIP so that there is no within-day vari-
ation in the option price sample.
Model
We use a generalized linear model (for an extensive
description, see McCullagh and Nelder [1989]) to model
the 3 survey probabilities. Let X represent the matrix of
data (covariates) available to the statistician. Respond-
ents’ unobserved true belief p is assumed to be related
to a linear combination of a subset of covariates X1 2 X,
through the logistic function,
pD f ¡ 1 X1b1ð ÞD 11C exp ¡X1b1ð Þ (3)
where bi is a vector of parameters corresponding to
the columns of Xi, i D 1, 2 (X2 will be introduced
in Equation 4). This function is the most commonly
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Figure 2. Average daily survey responses and corresponding option-implied probabilities. Note: These ﬁgures contain scatter
plots of the time series of the average daily survey response to each of the 3 main questions, and the corresponding option-
implied probability. For each day on which more than 10 survey responses were given, we compute the weighted average of
these responses—these are represented by circles in the ﬁgures. The corresponding option-implied probability for that day is
calculated as described in the Calculating OIPs section and the Supplemental Online Appendix. The 3 ﬁgures show the (survey
and market) probabilities of a greater than ¡20% return (>Minus20), a positive return (PositiveReturn), and a greater than 20%
return (>Plus20).
Table 1. Descriptive statistics of stated and option-implied probabilities.
Probability of Financial Market Survey
Return Observations Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
> ¡20% 46,232 0.830 0.049 0.758 0.200
>0% 47,438 0.571 0.029 0.404 0.268
> 20% 45,657 0.240 0.043 0.271 0.216
Note. Summary statistics for the aggregate sample, computed over all person-wave observations. The rows show means and standard deviations of the 3 proba-
bilities used: the probability of a more than ¡20% return (“> ¡20%”), a positive return (“>0%”), and a greater than 20% return (“> 20%”). The second column
shows the number of person-wave observations, the third and fourth show the means and standard deviations of the ﬁnancial market beliefs and the last 2
columns show these statistics for the survey beliefs.
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used link function for binary data (see Albert and
Chib [1993]).
Due to evidence suggesting that survey respondents
report their belief with error, we assume that their response
is a beta-distributed random variable, p~, for which
E½p~D p holds. The beta distribution is well suited for
describing probabilities or proportions because it is deﬁned
on the unit interval and has a ﬂexible functional form that
allows for a wide variety of shapes (e.g., Viscusi and Hakes
[2003], Law and Kelton [1982]). It has been used to model
survey responses in Bruine de Bruin, Fischbeck, Stiber, and
Fischhoff [2002] and earlier by Winkler [1967].
In addition, as noted previously, a substantial propor-
tion of responses are clustered at particular values corre-
sponding to round numbers. We choose to explicitly
model the probability of a response of 0, 50, or 100 as a
function of observable covariates, for the following reasons.
First, a number of articles (e.g., Fischhoff and Bruine de
Bruin [1999]) have noted that a response of 50 should be
considered as distinct from other responses as it can indi-
cate uncertainty or a lack of probabilistic sophistication of
the respondent rather than a true subjective probability of
50%. In addition, a response of 50% may indicate partition
priming (e.g., Fox and Rottenstreich [2003], Fox and
Clemen [2005]) where open-ended questions such as the
ones we study result in a twofold case partition (e.g., the
probability the event will happen versus the probability
that it will not), inducing the respondent to assign equal
probabilities to both the event and its complement. Fur-
ther, responses of 0 or 100 are special in that they indicate
pure certainty of the survey respondent but cannot
equal the true probability of an uncertain event occurring.
These three responses might therefore reﬂect a lesser ability
on the part of the respondent to express oneself in probabi-
listic terms. We refer to these responses as focal responses
henceforth, and use the approach formulated in Hurd et al.
[1998] to model the propensity of giving a focal response
via a latent variable w:
wDX2b2C h (4)
with h a normally distributed error term with mean zero
and variance 1. A nonfocal answer is given if and only if
w < 0. When the latent variable w  0, rather than
reporting their actual actual p~ respondents instead give a
focal response of zero, 50, or one hundred, depending on
where p~ lies relative to ﬁxed thresholds:
pD 0 if p~c0
pD 0:5 if c0< p~<c1
pD 1 if p~c1
(5)
The complete model therefore consists of a system of
two equations; we estimate it via maximum likelihood
(details of the parameterization of the beta distribution
and the likelihood calculation are contained in Supple-
mental Online Appendix C). It is assumed that the
sets of covariates (X1 and X2) determining both an indi-
vidual’s true belief and their propensity to give a focal
response are the same for all three subjective probability
thresholds. We therefore group all three responses
together in our estimation but include dummy variables
for each response in recognition of the fact that the aver-
age response corresponding to each of the three thresh-
olds is different.
Results
We estimate both equations jointly; the results for Equa-
tion 3 are reported in Table 2. Because the highly nonlin-
ear nature of the model makes it difﬁcult to interpret the
estimated coefﬁcients, we follow the convention for these
models and instead report marginal effects and their
associated standard errors.10 In addition, unless other-
wise noted, our discussion of the results is with reference
to statistical signiﬁcance at the 95% level of conﬁdence.
The two columns of Table 2 contain estimates associ-
ated with the subjective probability assessment p (from
Equation 3), with the second column containing results
of a regression with additional covariates added to the X1
matrix to account for the level of probabilistic under-
standing of the respondent (discussed subsequently).
The main variable of interest is the OIP, representing the
beliefs of ﬁnancial market participants (described in the
Calculating OIPs section). The OIP enters the model in
logit form (f :ð Þ, the inverse of the logistic function in
Equation 3) to be consistent with our treatment of the
subjective response (i.e., the dependent variable is also in
logit form). Both equations also include demographic
controls (i.e., gender, age, race, education, and marital
status), dummy variables for the 3 questions and proxies
for stock market knowledge (i.e., two self-reported
assessments: how closely the respondent follows the
stock market and his or her understanding of it). The
estimation additionally includes dummy variables for
whether the respondent owns stocks or has a retirement
account (as proxies for wealth and ﬁnancial wellbeing);
we assume such ownership has no bearing on the likeli-
hood of a focal response.
Subjective probability results
The coefﬁcient on our main variable of interest, the OIP,
is statistically signiﬁcant, suggesting that the views of
survey respondents indeed resemble the probabilities
implied by option prices. The marginal effect of 0.173
implies that a 10-percentage-point increase in the OIP
on average is associated with an increase in survey
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respondents’ probability by 1.73 percentage points. Sur-
vey respondents’ beliefs are thus positively related to
OIPs, but on average this relation is far from 1-to-1.
That the survey probabilities only partially reﬂect a
change in OIPs is consistent with a variety of behavioral
theories on the partial updating of beliefs (for a discus-
sion of these in the context of ﬁnancial markets, see
Hirshleifer [2001]). The effects still may vary substan-
tially across individuals, for example, according to an
individual’s level of probabilistic understanding. We con-
sider this possibility in the next section.
To avoid multicollinearity, it is necessary to suppress
one category of each set of dummy variables in the esti-
mation. The constant (not shown) indicates the pre-
dicted subjective probability of a hypothetical person
whose other covariates are equal to 0 (i.e., the person
belongs to all the suppressed categories and the logit
(OIP) is equal to 0).11 In this case, the hypothetical per-
son is predicted to give a response of 26.3% to >Plus20.
Any other predicted response can be calculated by add-
ing the marginal effects in the table to this percentage.
For example, the predicted responses to PositiveReturn
and >Minus20 for the hypothetical respondent
are 34.0% (26.3% C 7.7%) and 66.1%. In contrast,
when the control variables are evaluated at their popula-
tion averages, the predicted responses to >Minus20,
PositiveReturn, and >Plus20 are 67.2%, 34.0%, and
27.4%, respectively. Note that because the OIP is time
varying, the predicted responses for any individual also
will vary over time. When in addition to the control vari-
ables the OIP is also evaluated at its mean value for each
threshold, the predicted responses are 76.2%, 39.1%, and
26.8%, respectively. These values are close to the descrip-
tive statistics reported in Table 1 that do not take into
account the respondents’ characteristics (i.e., 75.8%,
40.4%, and 27.1%, respectively).
The results also enable us to draw inference about the
relative optimism of people with various characteristics,
ceteris paribus. For example, those that own stocks or
have a retirement account are more optimistic about the
stock market than those who do not, stating on average a
2.4 and 2.0 percentage points higher belief of the return
going over a given threshold. In addition, the predicted
probabilities of those that profess to have a good under-
standing of the stock market are on average 2.4 percent-
age points higher than for those who report no
understanding of the stock market (the omitted cate-
gory), while they are 0.9 percentage points higher for
those with a medium understanding. Those that claim to
be somewhat following the stock market are 2.8 percent-
age points more optimistic than those who do not follow
it (the omitted category). Interestingly, those who claim
to be closely following the stock market are less (1.4 per-
centage points) optimistic, perhaps reﬂecting their anxi-
ety about large absolute returns in the aftermath of the
ﬁnancial crisis (Gherzi, Egan, Stewart, Haisley, and
Ayton [2014]).
Finally, the demographic controls (not shown) indi-
cate that men, older people, non-Hispanic Whites, non-
Hispanic Blacks, and more highly educated people have
more optimistic beliefs about the stock market than do
the rest of the population. These results are in line with
patterns documented in earlier literature (e.g., Kezdi and
Willis [2003], Dominitiz and Manski [2011]).
Inconsistent responses
In addition to the statistical challenge of focal responses,
addressed via the model, a further challenge is that a rel-
atively large proportion (approximately 20%) of response
sets12 are inconsistent with the laws of probability (prob-
abilities adding up to more than 100%), perhaps suggest-
ing that some respondents did not fully understand
the questions.13 Ben-David et al. [2010] documented
Table 2. Regression results, Equation 3.
Model 1 Model 2
@p* @p*
Option-Implied Probability 0.174 0.250
(0.014) (0.014)
Inconsistent 0.088
(0.003)
Inconsistent * OIP ¡0.437
(0.008)
>Minus20 0.398 0.407
(0.009) (0.009)
Positive Return 0.077 0.079
(0.006) (0.006)
Stock Owner 0.024 0.025
(0.002) (0.002)
Has Retirement Account 0.020 0.022
(0.002) (0.002)
Closely Following 0.014 0.013
(0.004) (0.004)
Somewhat Following 0.028 0.028
(0.002) (0.002)
Good Understanding 0.024 0.023
(0.004) (0.004)
Medium Understanding 0.009 0.008
(0.002) (0.002)
Demographic Controls* YES YES
c0 0.114 0.110
(0.002) (0.002)
c1 0.831 0.828
(0.003) (0.003)
Observations 139,327 139,327
Log Likelihood ¡70,125 ¡66,969
Note. Marginal effects are reported, with standard errors in parentheses. All
coefﬁcients are signiﬁcant at the 5% level. All variables except the Option
Implied Probability are dummy variables. Model 1 shows the baseline
results; model 2 additionally considers the effect of probabilistic under-
standing by including a dummy variable equal to 1 if a person provided
inconsistent responses and an interaction term between the option implied
probability and that variable. Sampling weights are used.
Demographic controls are gender, age, race, education, and marital status.
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miscalibration of survey respondents with respect to
probability distributions in their sample of Chief Finan-
cial Ofﬁcers; Fox, Rogers, and Tversky [1996] also noted
that even experienced option traders violate basic proba-
bility principles. Such miscalibration is likely to be more
severe among the general population in our sample. This
naturally raises the question of the extent to which the
survey responses represent a respondent’s true beliefs
and, if they do not, whether this affects our estimated
connection between survey and market beliefs.
To investigate this question, we re-estimate the model
with an additional control variable that indicates whether
a set of responses is inconsistent with the laws of proba-
bility; in addition we interact this control with the OIP
to allow the main effect of interest to differ depending
on whether or not a person provided consistent
responses in a given wave. As noted previously, the esti-
mates associated with the probability of a focal response
(Equation 4) remain unchanged.
The results from including these additional covariates
are displayed in the second column of Table 2. Control-
ling for inconsistency strengthens our earlier ﬁndings.
For people with consistent answers, the effect is 50%
larger than that of the baseline effect: a 10% increase in
the OIP is associated with a 2.5-percentage-point
increase in their beliefs. In contrast, people with incon-
sistent responses are less likely to provide subjective
probabilities that are in line with option implied proba-
bilities; if the OIP increases by 10%, their belief decreases
by 1.9 percentage points (0.249 ¡ 0.437 D ¡0.188).
Conclusion
Are subjective probability responses from surveys at
odds with probabilities derived from ﬁnancial markets
data? A novel approach, comparing survey responses to
probabilistic questions about future stock market perfor-
mance with their corresponding OIPs, investigates 1
aspect of this question: whether ﬁnancial market proba-
bilities coincide with the views of survey respondents.
We ﬁnd a signiﬁcant relationship between the probabili-
ties extracted from option prices and those elicited from
longitudinal survey responses. The analysis demonstrates
that subjective response elicitations are useful reﬂections
of sentiment regarding the ﬁnancial markets and are not
necessarily at odds with the views of ﬁnancial market
participants as seen through option prices.
The results further show, however, that while OIPs are
linked to survey respondents’ outlook, the association is
far from 1 to 1. Speciﬁcally, on average a 10-percentage-
point increase in the OIP that future DJIA returns will
exceed a given threshold leads to a 1.73-percentage-point
increase in the average beliefs of the survey respondents.
This effect is larger (2.49 percentage points) for those
who give responses consistent with the laws of probabil-
ity, and negative (–1.88 percentage points) for those who
give inconsistent responses. When considered in the con-
text of the large literature documenting that a higher
degree of ﬁnancial literacy leads to better ﬁnancial fore-
casts and decisions (e.g., Bernheim and Garrett [2003],
Lusardi and Mitchel [2011]), our results provide further
evidence of a link between mathematical skill and ﬁnan-
cial literacy (Lusardi [2012]). The results also demon-
strate a possible way that observed inconsistencies in
survey responses may prove useful for inference—sug-
gesting caution be exercised before imposing such con-
sistency through the survey design.
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Notes
1. We thank an anonymous referee for drawing our atten-
tion to this distinction. Barone-Adesi et al. [2013] did
note, however, that by linking S&P returns to future
price-earnings ratios, stock returns also can be trans-
formed to be somewhat forward looking.
2. Throughout this article, we use the word link to describe
an association or resemblance and emphasize that the
association we document is not necessarily causal.
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Therefore, our investigation is more motivated by an
interest in whether two possibly distinct sources of infor-
mation can yield the same underlying views, rather than
identifying whether option prices drive individuals’ beliefs
or vice versa. Barone-Adesi et al.’s [2013] deﬁnition of
sentiment that amounts to a change of measure between
observed prices and investors’ beliefs is 1 example of a the-
oretical model that would give rise to such an association
but it is important to emphasize that other explanations
and models are also possible.
3. Weights are determined by the RAND Corporation via an
iterative (raking) process until the weighted distribution is
sufﬁciently close to the target distribution (i.e., the Cur-
rent Population Survey).
4. A referee suggested that weights should not be used in the
regression analyses; results without weights are available
from the authors on request. The results are qualitatively
similar both with and without weights although not using
weights strengthens our results, both due to an increase in
the coefﬁcient of interest and tighter standard errors,
resulting in greater signiﬁcance of all variables. See Solon,
Haider and Wooldridge [2015] for a comprehensive dis-
cussion of the use of weights in regression analysis.
5. The exact wording of these questions is: “By next year at
this time, what are the chances that mutual fund shares
invested in blue-chip stocks like those in the Dow Jones
Industrial Average will have increased (fallen) in value by
more than 20% compared with what they are worth
today?” Assuming respondents satisfy binary additivity, as
most theories of subjective beliefs do and as also has been
empirically demonstrated (see Windschitl [2000] and
references therein), the probability of a > 20% decrease in
value is equal to 1 minus the probability of a more than
¡20% return. The response to the > 20% decrease ques-
tion is thus subtracted from 100% to correspond to a
greater than ¡20% return. This alternative representation
will be useful in the analysis when comparing the subjec-
tive response values to expectations inferred from option
prices.
6. See, for example, Hurd et al. [1998], Bassett and Lums-
daine [2000], Lillard and Willis [2001], Hurd and
McGarry [2002], Kezdi and Willis [2003], Manski [2004],
Kleinjans and Van Soest [2010], Manski and Molinari
[2010], and Dominitz and Manski [2011].
7. Speciﬁcally, we calculate the risk-neutral probability
density by taking the second derivative of the price of
a call option with regard to the strike price (Breeden
and Litzenberger [1978]), and obtain the OIPs by
adjusting for the 6% equity premium that corresponds
to the historical equity premium over the period 1961
to 2011. Further information is provided in Supple-
mental Online Appendix B. As noted there, we have
also estimated all results under the risk-neutral
assumption (i.e., without the equity premium); the
results are robust to this change.
8. For more information on the calculation of the implied
volatility, see Cui and Frank [2011]. The document can be
found by typing DOCS 2056700 <GO> when logged in
to a Bloomberg terminal.
9. The OIP is akin to Barone-Adesi et al.’s [2013] “represen-
tative investor.” In their approach, they compare the
beliefs of the representative investor to beliefs derived
from the historical distribution of returns (as measured by
a “rational investor,” that is one whose beliefs are assumed
to be “objectively correct” [p. 4]) and deﬁne sentiment to
be the change of measure linking the two sets of beliefs. In
contrast, in our framework, we compare the beliefs of the
representative investor to those drawn from the subjective
response distribution, without making assumptions about
what is the correct distribution.
10. The estimated coefﬁcients and associated standard
errors, as well as the estimation results for Equation 4
are available in Supplemental Online Appendix D.
Although in the estimation procedure the subjective
probability and focal response likelihood equations are
estimated jointly, the likelihood of a focal response is
invariant to the choice of covariates included in the X1
matrix used to estimate the subjective probability and
hence will not affect the estimates of the main coefﬁ-
cient of interest. Equation 4 estimates were relegated
to the Supplemental Online Appendix at the suggestion
of the referee.
11. This hypothetical person is a non-Hispanic man who is
unmarried; did not attend college; is currently not work-
ing, and does not own a home, stocks, or a retirement
account; professes to have a bad understanding of the
stock market and claims to not follow it. Additionally, in
this hypothetical situation, the noncategorical variable
(the logit of the OIP) is equal to 0, which implies the OIP
itself is 50%.
12. That is, the 3-tuple of a person’s >Minus20, PositiveRe-
turn, and >Plus20 responses for a given wave.
13. That the sum of responses to 3 or more related probability
questions often exceed 1, in contrast to binary additivity
holding when there are only 2 responses elicited, is dis-
cussed in Windschitl [2000].
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